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Abstract 
This paper presents the market concept of a local peer-to-peer (p2p) marketplace that enables small consumers to buy electricity 
different from their local utility and offer their generation for sale. The marketplace considers network constraints to ensure 
technical feasibility of local market transactions and the grid effect of the trades are priced by a dynamic network usage tariff 
(DNUT). Thus orders at the local market include the related network connection point. Such a local market can provide implicit 
congestion management and voltage regulation services for distribution system operators.  
1 Introduction 
Small consumers, households are not able to participate either 
at current wholesale or at flexibility markets mainly because 
of the relatively high one-off costs and minimum bid sizes. 
Development began in two directions to solve this issue: 
aggregation (bottom-up) and market development for local use 
cases (top-down). The former one is based on grouping small 
parties and representing them at current markets where the 
participation conditions such as minimum bid size cannot be 
met individually. Whereas the latter approach aims at the 
introduction of new, specialized marketplaces for small 
consumers.  
Furthermore, small consumers are connected to the 
distribution system where the need for flexible sources is 
growing, too. Aggregating household-size flexibility to 
provide TSO ancillary services is yet more difficult as such 
services are defined with strict and rigid requirements (e.g. 
continuous availability, short time to respond). Instead, the 
proposed local market concept considers what is preferable for 
the local grid operator and is not based on direct activation of 
flexibility. 
In the framework of the H2020 INTERRFACE project, a local 
market platform is being developed and demonstrated that is 
aware of the grid effects of the trades. A complementary 
trading platform is targeted to facilitate p2p energy 
transactions between small users and to use DNUT to motivate 
market players to carry out network-advantageous 
transactions. The trading and settlement rules are designed 
primarily for low and medium voltage (LV and MV) networks, 
they build upon the radial structure of the topology. 
One advantage of the proposed local market concept is that 
nothing is changing for non-participating grid users, while 
active users can benefit from the local market trading. The 
local market trading platform and the current retail market are 
planned to operate in parallel. The consumer can participate in 
both markets. Its energy demand can be partly procured from 
the local market, while the remaining need is settled by the 
supplier. Local market participation is not obligatory but open 
for all local grid users (consumers, prosumers, producers and 
storage owners). Local trading is incentivizing as it enables an 
opportunity for buying electricity low and selling it high. Also, 
soft effects can promote it, such as community-forming, the 
choice of buying from the neighbour or a low-carbon supply, 
and independency from the retailer (partly self-sufficiency). 
Local market trading supports on one hand the local usage of 
the near generation reducing grid loss and the reverse flow in 
radial grids as well as helps to accommodate distributed 
renewable generation. Moreover, economic benefits of local 
market trading incentivize for trading at a market that is aware 
of the grid constraints and thus provides implicit congestion 
management or even voltage regulation service for the DSO. 
Several local markets have been proposed in the literature. 
However, most are virtual (only trading) arrangements and do 
not consider the grid behind [1]–[3]. The Brooklyn microgrid 
[1], for instance, is similarly a continuous local p2p market, 
but is implemented using blockchain. It also aims at RES 
integration with local energy consumers and provides 
flexibility for the DSO. However, the DSO’s flexibility 
activation here is explicit unlike in the proposed market model, 
where DSO aspects are considered by the market algorithm 
based on load flow-like investigations.  Another similarity to 
the hereby described p2p local market is that both markets can 
operate in addition to the conventional supplier model. Sonnen 
[2] is a virtual community where prosumers equipped with PV, 
battery and a corresponding battery energy management 
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system (SonnenBatterie) are connected. The community 
provides balancing services for the TSO that is not the case in 
the proposed INTERRFACE local p2p market. Sonnen is the 
supplier of the consumers in the community, while the 
INTERRFACE local market consumers can choose any 
suppliers freely as a complement to the local market. A third 
example is the Powerpeers local market platform [3]. On this 
market, if any need cannot be met from the local trades, 
Powerpeers supply the consumers as a retailer. 
 
2. The proposed local market concept 
This section describes the high level concept of the local 
market starting with its attributes and timeline to examples. 
1.1. Attributes of the local market 
A continuous trading platform is being developed for the local 
market in contrast to the usually auction-based local markets 
([4]-[8]). When hitting an order, one should be able to consider 
both its price and its owner. Therefore, the trading platform is 
suggested to be non-anonym as default in order to emphasize 
its p2p characteristic. However, it can be anonymous for 
example due to GDPR issues. Further enhancements could be 
delivered if bids can be flagged as anonymous – this could 
create additional benefits, through increasing the pool of 
available matches. Also as default, there is no automatic 
execution of matchable orders by the platform, the bidders 
need to hit the preferable orders. In this case however, market 
participants can use automatic bidding strategy if a well-
defined API is available for the platform. Nevertheless the 
platform can be also operated enabling automatic pairing of 
orders based on the order prices. 
The subject of transactions is energy delivery in a defined 
period. The timeline of the suggested platform is similar to a 
continuous intraday platform using only quarter-hour energy 
products. There are two main differences compared to the 
standard European intraday platforms: no automatic execution 
as default (it is optional) and the clearing price is different for 
seller and buyer because of the dynamic network usage tariff. 
For each transaction on the local market a DNUT is calculated 
based on the location of the partner, the current state of the 
network and the flexibility demand from the DSO. DNUT is 
automatically calculated and added to the energy price of the 
submitted order, hence the total order prices visible for other 
local grid users are the energy bid prices modified by the 
DNUT. Full bid prices are different in different nodes of the 
local grid leading to different nodal views of the order book. 
The proposed p2p local market is expected to be operated by 
an independent third party as default to fully fit into the 
European market environment and endeavour. Although, 
DSOs could be also imagined to operate such a market as 
having many connections to it. First of all, usually they owe 
the settlement meters and are responsible for the metering 
instead of a third party metering operator. Secondly, they are 
notably effected by the dynamic network usage tariff, and they 
have the chance to alter network usage tariffs in the local grid, 
possibly with the approval of the regulator. Thirdly, they face 
the distribution system problems (e.g. voltage problems, 
congestions, overloading of equipment) to be handled by the 
local market. The local market operator is also responsible for 
the settlement related to the transactions on the local market. 
1.2. Timeline 
The schedule of the suggested platform is similar to a 
continuous intraday market with quarter-hourly products. For 
each 15-minute delivery period, one product is defined. Gate-
opening for bid submission is in the afternoon of the previous 
day (D-1) for all products (e.g. at 5 PM). When the gate is 
opened, new orders can be placed by the market participants 
that can be also hit by other bidders. Each trading yields an 
energy exchange in the delivery period of the products. The 
trading period of each product is suggested to be closed close 
before the delivery time - maximum 1 hour before. 
The executed transaction obliges the buyer and seller 
participants to consume and produce the amount of energy 
specified in the transaction. In the case of missing this 
obligation (metered consumption and/or production is less 
than the settled), the relevant market player is subjected to 
punishment at the local market. 
1.3. Dynamic determination of network usage tariff  
End-user retail tariff consists of energy price and network 
usage tariff. The total transactional price on the local market 
platform has a similar approach. It consists of the energy price 
determined by the bidder and the dynamic network usage tariff 
calculated by the platform. The local DNUT is presumably 
lower than the general network tariff, since the local 
transactions do not use high voltage networks (nor the MV grid 
in the case of an LV market). Therefore, DNUT is a 
measurable incentive for local users to trade locally. 
DNUT calculation is an innovative method, which relies on 
load-flow approximations, as follows. A base-case for load 
and generation is forecasted for every 15-minute interval. It 
models under the assumption that users have a default 
consumption and production independently from the local 
market prices, even in the absence of a local market. Secondly, 
using the base-case flows, voltage-, current-, and loss 
sensitivity factors are calculated by load-flow simulations. The 
effect of trades on the system state (nodal voltages, branch 
currents, total loss) are estimated using the above defined 
sensitivity factors. 
These values are used to calculate the DNUT through 
weighting and fulfilling (one or more) predefined criteria 
according to the schedule of the demo: 
 Nodal voltages should be in a tolerance range [9]. 
 Network loss should be minimized. 
 Branch currents are limited by thermal constraints. 
The reason for not using load-flow for network condition 
calculations is because it is computationally intensive. Thus it 
would be time-consuming for continuous market operation, 
especially when considering numerous orders, and more than 
a hundred prosumers, as for each submitted order one load 
flow would calculate the DNUT for only one node. Moreover, 
DNUTs must be recalculated after each trade concluded. The 
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presented DNUT method can consider the following aspects 
(directly or indirectly): 
 network loss, 
 nodal voltage, 
 asymmetry level (through voltages and loss), 
 congestion of network elements (branch currents), 
 distance of partners (through voltages and loss), 
 time of network use (present in the market through volume 
and price of orders, but additional DNUT element can be 
designed based on the system operator’s need). 
As a consequence of dynamic network tariff, the settlement 
price on each connection point might differ. However, this 
does not mean that nodal pricing is used, since prices are not 
strictly connected to the nodes, rather to the transaction and the 
two partners in the transaction. There are different options 
regarding the payment of the DNUT: 
 The aggressor (that hits the order) is charged the full 
amount of network tariff. 
 The trade partners share the costs 50-50%. 
 The market participant placing the order is charged a fixed 
price as DNUT. The full cost is evaluated at order hitting, 
and the remainder is paid by the aggressor. 
1.4. Examples for the DNUT 
Examples are provided to show the operation of the proposed 
market. Only the cost of network loss as DNUT component is 
considered in these examples for the sake of simplicity. Energy 
flows and transactions are coloured differently. 
Firstly, assume a base network state for a given delivery 
period. It consists of the planned topology of the network and 
the forecasted energy flows between the local participants and 
the main grid. These base-case flows are denoted with blue 
arrows in Figure 1. HH represents a household consumer. 
 
Figure 1: Example for a base-case flow 
Each bid placed by local participants has a base (energy) price 
parameter defined by the bidder: how much they are willing to 
pay, or they would like to be paid for each offered kWh. The 
clearing price of each bid is modified with DNUT, and these 
modified values are shown to the other participants. Note that 
the settled DNUT depends on who will hit the bid. For each 
network point, DNUT is calculated by answering the following 
question: how much would the network cost be if the bid was 
hit on that network point. The transaction is not simply added 
to the base-case flows. In fact, the base-case is decomposed to 
the assumed transaction (denoted with green), and the 
remaining flow (still denoted with blue), as in Figure 2. The 
loss cost of the assumed transaction is calculated from the 
difference of the two cases: the total loss cost of the base-case 
(blue, Figure 1), and the total loss cost when the transaction is 
subtracted from the base-case (blue, Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2: The procedure of DNUT calculation if the 8 kW 
sale order of PV#1 was hit by HH#1. 
A local-market energy transaction may exceed the base-case 
flows, hence resulting in an overflow (denoted with red in 
Figure 3). The overflow is always modelled between the main 
grid and the market participant whose forecast was wrong. 
Base-case flows are modified properly if such a transaction is 
executed. After the modification, the procedure of DNUT 
calculation is the same as in the first case. The main grid has a 
different sale price (SP) and purchase price (PP) as marked in 
Figure 4. In this example, the aggressor pays the whole amount 
of network tariff. Although it might look unfair, this way both 
partners pay and get the price that is shown on the platform. 
 
Figure 3: The procedure of DNUT calculation if the 10 kW 
sale order of PV#1 was hit by HH#1. 
However, HH#1 is forecasted only to consume 8 kW; 
therefore, base-case flows have to be extended with 2 kW from 
the main grid to HH#1. Then DNUT is calculated from the 
difference between the network cost with blue, green and red 
flows and network cost in case of only blue and red flows. 
After delivery, the real flows can be determined from the meter 
data (black in Figure 4). Furthermore, these can be used when 
forecasting the base-case flows for the next day. 
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Figure 4: Metered physical flows 
Figure 5 gives a third example. Main grid supply price is 
60 €/MWh (with non-local grid tariff) while the purchase price 
for roof-top PV is 40 €/MWh for every participant. 
 
Figure 5: Example with 2 PV sale and 2 HH purchase orders 
The submitted bids at the other nodes appear as in Figure 6. 
Note that no transaction is executed yet, only the full prices are 
calculated for each node, modifying the energy bid price by 
the possible DNUT. If PV#1 hits the order of HH#1 whose 
limit purchase price is 52 €/MWh, PV#1 pays the DNUT as 
being the aggressor. The DNUT is 1.688 €/MWh considering 
the loss effects of the given transaction. This is subtracted from 
the original income, which results in a lower (50.312 €/MWh) 
price. The value of DNUT is suggested to be collected by the 
Local Market Operator. HH#1 pays 52 €/MWh and PV#1 gets 
only 50.3€/MWh. So the limit price of the purchase order of 
HH#1 is 50.3 €/MWh in the node of PV#1. 
The settlement of the local market transactions is based on the 
metered values. Each concluded energy trade is subtracted 
from the measurements and the remainder is settled according 
to the retail contract. A balancing-like, local financial 
sanctioning mechanism is suggested to avoid negative 
remainder (metered consumption is less than the contracted 
volumes). Apart from this sanction, grid users can also pay 
balancing costs according to their contracts. Small consumers 
are assumed to have partial supply-based contracts with no 
direct balancing costs, while larger customers have schedule-
based contracts with full balancing responsibility. Therefore, 
customers with schedule-based contracts are motivated to 
inform their BRP about their schedule change. Also, local 
market trades help avoiding balancing costs. It is the 
customers’ responsibility to inform their BRP if necessary. 
 
Figure 6: The bid prices at different nodes 
4 Conclusion 
A local p2p market concept has been developed that considers 
the grid effect of the trades and asset load limits. The concept 
fits for small consumers of the distribution grid as well as the 
aspects of the distribution system operator. It enables smaller 
distribution grid flexibility to integrate distributed RES. 
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